The reason it’s considered a meaningful concept is that Koizumi’s administration has such longevity and such a forceful personality. He’s been Prime Minister since 2001, which in Japan since the bursting of the Bubble is practically so long as to span multiple geological eras. To say the least, not all his reforms have gone through as originally planned, but he’s established a solid, if narrow, precedent for the Diet’s shaking things up even when the civil service leviathan opposes it. Takenaka managed the banking clean-up, and Koizumi later helped engineer a huge electoral victory by drawing a line in the sand when the House of Councillors dissed the Japan Post reform bill package. He’s been Bush’s staunchest ally in Asia in the WOT. He has that weird, brash, idiosyncratic charisma and that air of conviction: even when he’s making dubious decisions like vowing to continue his pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine, they don’t seem like stunts. I figure you know all this as information, Jeremy–I’m not saying it to be condescending; I’m just pointing out the particular things that will make the Koizumi administration a hard act to follow and make commentators wonder how things are going to shape up. There’s certainly talent in the upper reaches of the LDP, but Koizumi’s going to be a hard act to follow, and everyone knows it.

ポスト小泉の条件として?

What exactly is post-Koizumi? I never got a clear handle on that. I thought it was just “life after Koizumi steps down.” Is he basically just saying that “no one will have power after I leave, unless they follow these tenants”?